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“SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES” STATUTORY REACH OR 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION?: ANALYSIS OF 
UNITED STATES V. PRADO 
Ellex N. Loper* 
This Note analyzes, in the context of  United States v. Prado, 
whether under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, the 
phrase “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” 
implicates subject matter jurisdiction. The Second Circuit in 
Prado held that subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. The Fifth, Eleventh 
and D.C. Circuit have held otherwise. This Note ultimately 
concludes that clarification is needed to resolve this split and the 
clarification should align with the Second Circuit.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1986, Congress enacted The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 
(MDLEA).1
 
Congress found that it was “necessary to facilitate 
enforcement by the Coast Guard of laws relating to the importation of 
illegal drugs.”2
 
MDLEA “specifically relates to extraterritorial jurisdiction 
on the high seas and grants the Coast Guard authority to board foreign 
flagged vessels on the high seas in enumerated circumstances.” 3
 
Additionally, MDLEA “supports the United States' commitments under 
the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.”4
 
 
“United States counter-drug operations focus on three . . .areas: (1) 
Source Zone (supplier countries in South America); (2) Transit Zone (a 7 
million square mile area between source countries in  South America and 
                                            
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2021, University of Maine School of Law. 
 1.  Elania Aquila, Courts Have Gone Overboard In Applying The Maritime Drug Law 
Enforcement Act, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2965, 2975 (2018). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Mary B. Neumayr, Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act: An Analysis, 11 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 487, 487-488 (1988). 
 4.  Justin Daniel, Operational Diplomacy: Jurisdiction Certification and the Maritime 
Drug Law Enforcement Act, 29 IND. INT’l & COMP. L. REV. 1,1 (2019). 
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Arrival Zone in North America); and (3) Arrival Zone (where narcotics 
arrive in United States and Canada).”5 “MDLEA provides the basis for 
Coast Guard drug interdiction efforts in the Caribbean and in the eastern 
Pacific off the coast of Central and South America.”6
 
The findings and 
declaration of MDLEA state “that trafficking in controlled substances 
aboard vessels is a serious international problem . . . and presents a specific 
threat to the security of the United States and operating or embarking in a 
submersible vessel or semi-submersible vessel without nationality and on 
an international voyage is a serious international problem.”7
 
To pass 
MDLEA, Congress relied on Article 1, Section 8, Clause 10 of the 
Constitution, which states “Congress shall have power . . . To define and 
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences 
against the Law of Nations….”8  
Additionally, Congress relied on Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, of the 
Constitution, known as the “Necessary and Proper Clause,” which 
broadens Congress’s authority. This Clause allows Congress to “make all 
Laws [that] shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” its 
enumerated powers. 9
 
In other words, MDLEA was established pursuant 
to powers enumerated in the Constitution, and not only to serve United 
States’ interests, but to promote and align international interest against 
enforcing laws against illicit drugs. Turning to the language of MDLEA, 
“the term ‘vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States’ includes 
a vessel without nationality.”10
 
Under MDLEA, “the term ‘vessel without 
nationality’ includes-- 
(A) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge 
makes a claim of registry that is denied by the nation whose 
registry is claimed; 
(B) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge fails, 
on request of an officer of the United States authorized to 
enforce applicable provisions of United States law, to make a 
claim of nationality or registry for that vessel; and 
                                            
 5.  Alexander D. Andruzzi, Circuit Split on the Application of the "Safety Valve" 
Provision as Applied to the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act - Alexander and 
Mosquera-Murillo, 24 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 250, 252 (2019). Available at: 
https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj/vol24/iss2/6 [https://perma.cc/N54B-
P8RQ]. 
 6.  CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R7-5700, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION 
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 18 (2016).  
 7.  46 U.S.C. § 70501 (2008). 
 8.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; Aquila, supra note 1, at 2965. 
 9.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Aquila, supra note 1, at 2972. 
 10.  46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(A) (2008). 
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(C) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge 
makes a claim of registry  and for which the claimed nation of 
registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally  assert that 
the vessel is of its nationality.11 
In order to claim nationality, MDLEA states that a claim of nationality 
or registry includes “(1) possession on board the vessel and production of 
documents evidencing the vessel’s nationality. . .; (2) flying its nation’s 
ensign or flag; or (3) a verbal claim of nationality or registry by the master 
or individual in charge of the vessel.”12 
MDLEA states that one of the prohibited acts “while on board a 
covered vessel, [is that] an individual may not knowingly or intentionally 
manufacture or distribute, or possess with intent to manufacture or 
distribute, a controlled substance.”13
 
A covered vessel under MDLEA 
means “a vessel of the United States or a vessel subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States.”14
  
In order to offer some clarification to MDLEA in 
1996, Congress amended the Maritime Act. It did so by expanding the 
definition of what constitutes a stateless vessel, 46 U.S.C. app. § 
1903(c)(2)(C), and by adding a provision reading in pertinent part as 
follows: 
“Jurisdiction of the United States with respect to vessels subject 
to this chapter is not an element of any offense. All jurisdictional 
issues arising under this chapter are preliminary questions of law 
to be determined solely by the trial judge.”15 
Combining these definitions together, the issue turns on whether a 
vessel without a nationality, engaging in a prohibited act under MDLEA 
is subject to the jurisdiction of the State. 
This Note will analyze a decision from the Second Circuit16
 
concerning the phrase of the MDLEA that has prompted a circuit split; 
“subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” The split focuses 
specifically on whether “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” in 
MDLEA implicates subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, this Note 
will contend that the Second Circuit reached the correct decision in stating 
that “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” does not implicate 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
                                            
 11.  46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(A-C) (2008). 
 12.  46 U.S.C. § 70502(e) (2008).  
 13.  46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) (2008). 
 14.  46 U.S.C. § 70503(e)(1) (2008). 
 15.  United States v. Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440, 442-443 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 16.  United States v. Prado, 933 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2019). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Prado Background 
Officers of the United States Coast Guard received a tip that a drug 
cartel was sending a go-fast carrying cocaine from Colombia towards 
Costa Rica.17
 
A “go-fast” is a small, rapid speed boat, which, because of 
its speed and low profile, is often used in drug trafficking.18
 
“Go-fast boats 
are specially made vessels, typically made of fiberglass, designed to carry 
large quantities of drugs with a low surface profile, which helps them 
avoid visual or radar detection.”19 
The Coast Guard spotted a small craft in international waters off the 
border between Nicaragua and Costa Rica.20
 
The Coast Guard intercepted 
the boat after the Coast Guard fired on the vessel and disabled the vessel’s 
engines.21
 
The Coast Guard boarded the vessel and encountered the only 
three people on the vessel, the defendants, Joaquin Alarcon Prado, Hector 
Valencia Bautista, and Luis Armando Valencia Bautista, along with 680 
kilograms of cocaine.
 
The government’s affidavit states that the vessel was not flying a flag, 
“nor did it have any signs of registry painted on the side of the vessel.”22
 
While the Government claims that there was no flag and the vessel was 
not under a nationality, the defendants claim that even though they were 
not flying a flag, they did have a large Ecuadorian flag painted on the side 
of their vessel.23
 
The Coast Guard set fire to the vessel and sank it.24
 
The 
defendants, after indictment, moved for various forms of relief and a 
hearing was conducted to determine if the vessel was stateless.25 “The 
district court conducted a hearing . . . to determine whether the vessel on 
board which drugs were found was subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States. The theory of the government was that the vessel was subject to the 
                                            
 17.  Id. at 126. 
 18.  Id. at 126. 
 19.  Christopher Woody, The US Coast Guard and Navy pulled a half-ton of cocaine 
from a burning go-fast boat in the Pacific (Apr. 26, 2018, 12:42 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/coast-guard-navy-half-ton-cocaine-smuggling-2018-4, 
[https://perma.cc/A8PV-TUJH].  
 20.  Prado, 933 F.3d 121 at 126. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 127. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
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jurisdiction of the United States because it was without nationality.”26 The 
court concluded that it was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(A) and refused to dismiss the indictment.27 
The defendants pleaded guilty to the charges of “conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine, and of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 
while on board a stateless vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States in violation of . . . MDLEA.”28
 
The defendants were sentenced to 
twenty-four months of imprisonment and three years of supervised 
release.29
 
The main issue of the case, and the main contention by the 
defendants, was whether the vessel the defendants were on was subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States.30
 
A secondary issue, and the focus of 
this analysis, is if the failure by the government to establish that the vessel 
was without nationality (not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States) 
also meant that the court was without subject matter jurisdiction.31 The 
defendants claimed that the “government’s failure to show that the vessel 
was ‘subject to the jurisdiction of the United States’ is a defect as to the 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”32
 
In regards to whether subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States implicates subject matter jurisdiction, the 
court found that “the MDLEA's reference poses the question whether its 
prohibition on drug possession extends to the vessel in question — not 
whether a prosecution under the statute falls within the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.”33 
In other words, the court held that being subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction and instead 
is a question of whether the vessel is covered under the statute or not. The 
Prado court ultimately held that § 70504(a) of the MDLEA requires a 
court to make a preliminary determination of jurisdictional issues, thus if 
the government fails to show that the vessel was subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States, the court should dismiss the indictment.34
 
The court 
                                            
 26.  Id. at 126. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 127. 
 30.  There is an additional circuit split on whether jurisdiction under MDLEA is a 
question for the judge or the jury to decide. See United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 
1166–67 (9th Cir. 2004) (jurisdiction facts are to be decided by a jury). But see United 
States v. Tinoco, 304 F. 3d 1088, 1108–09 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Vilches 
Navarrete, 523 U.S. 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2008) (The Eleventh and First Circuit have held that 
jurisdiction facts are to be decided by a judge). 
 31.  Prado, 933 F.3d 121 at 132. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 133. 
 34.  Id. at 153. 
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determined the Government did not demonstrate that the vessel was 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and dismissed the 
indictment and vacated the convictions for all the defendants.35
 
The court 
reasoned that the Coast Guard did not affirmatively establish that the 
vessel was stateless and thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States.36 
B. Circuit Split 
The cases in this Note that highlight the circuit split all focus on 
similar facts. An agency of the United States government, usually the 
Coast Guard, intercepts a vessel in international waters and boards the 
vessel.37
 
Sometimes the Coast Guard disables the vessel if it is trying to 
flee without first determining if the vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States. The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for 
“maritime drug interdiction;” to enforce MDLEA the Coast Guard 
employs a system involving ships, aircraft, boats and specialized forces.38
 
Once the Coast Guard has intercepted the vessel the Coast Guard it then 
determines if the vessel is flying without a nationality and is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States.39 
 
The Coast Guard can determine that 
the vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States through several 
methods: the master or individual in charge can make a claim of registry 
that is denied by the nation; the master or individual in charge fails on 
request to make a claim of nationality or registry of the vessel; or the 
master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry which the nation 
does not affirmatively agree with.40
 
The cases involve varying drugs and 
amounts, but typically very large quantities.41
 
Some of the cases also 
included defendants who have pleaded guilty and are attempting to appeal 
their conviction.42 
                                            
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 130.  
 37.  See generally, Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1092 (drugs seized by the Coast Guard in 
international waters); United States v. Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622, 624 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(drugs seized in international waters by the Coast Guard); United States v. Gonzalez, 311 
F.3d 440, 444 (1st Cir. 2002) (Coast Guard went to rescue the go-fast located on the high 
seas approximately eighteen nautical miles southwest of the British Virgin Islands).  
 38.  Daniel, supra note 4, at 2-3.  
 39.  See Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088; Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622; Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440. 
 40.  46 U.S.C.S. § 70502(d) (2008). 
 41.  See Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088; Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622; Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440. 
 42.  Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d at 625; Prado, 933 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2019). 
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The split in regard to whether “subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States” implicates subject matter after the Prado decision is 3-2. The Fifth, 
Eleventh and D.C. Circuit have held in some form that “subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States” is associated with subject matter 
jurisdiction.43
 
In other words, the Fifth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuit have 
come to understand that “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” 
is “a congressionally imposed limit on courts’ subject matter 
jurisdiction.”44
 
The First Circuit and Second Circuit, as stated in the Prado 
case, have found that “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” does 
not implicate subject matter jurisdiction and simply has to do with the 
scope of the statute.45
 
The cases at issue on the split involve stateless 
vessels, thus the issue turns on whether statelessness goes towards subject 
matter jurisdiction or to something else, such as the scope of the statute or 
element of a crime. 
1. Subject to the Jurisdiction of the United States Does Implicate Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction 
The Eleventh Circuit case involved the United States Coast Guard in 
international waters near the Columbian/Ecuadorian border.46
 
The Coast 
Guard intercepted a go-fast vessel with four individuals and the Coast 
Guard seized 1,807 kilograms of cocaine.47
 
The Eleventh Circuit’s 
position is that, “the question of whether a vessel is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States should be treated purely as an issue of 
subject matter jurisdiction.”48
 
The Tinoco court reasoned that “the 1996 
Amendment to the MDLEA removes the statutory ambiguity. By adding 
to the MDLEA the jurisdiction and venue provision, 46 U.S.C. app. § 
1903(f), Congress indicated that whether a vessel is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States is solely an issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction.”49
 
The Eleventh Circuit has gone on to elaborate in a different 
case that, “we have interpreted the ‘on board a vessel subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States’ portion of the MDLEA as a 
congressionally imposed limit on courts' subject matter jurisdiction.”50 
                                            
 43.  Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1112-16; Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d at 626-28; United States v. 
Munoz Miranda, 780 F.3d 1185, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 44.  Aquila, supra note 2, at 2985. 
 45.  Prado, 933 F.3d at 133. 
 46.  Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1092. 
 47.  Id. at 1093. 
 48.  Id. at 1107. 
 49.  Id. at 1105. 
 50.  U.S. v. De La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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The Fifth Circuit case involved slightly different facts than the Prado 
case analyzed in this Note. A freighter bound for Portugal was sailing 
through international waters and was suspected to be used for drug 
trafficking.51
 
The United States Coast Guard boarded the vessel after being 
given permission by the vessel’s government and found four tons of 
cocaine.52
 
The Fifth Circuit aligns with the Eleventh Circuit; “we conclude 
that the district court's preliminary determination of whether a flag nation 
has consented or waived objection to the enforcement of United States law 
is a prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction.”53
 
Both the Eleventh and Fifth
 
Circuits have stated that “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” 
requirement “constituted a congressionally imposed limit on courts’ 
subject matter jurisdiction, akin to the amount-in-controversy requirement 
contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.”54 
The D.C. Circuit, in determination of the issue at hand, decided a case 
with similar facts to Prado, as it involved drug smuggling as well as the 
use of a go-fast to transport drugs from Colombia to other locations.55
 
The 
D.C. Circuit stated that “we agree with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and 
conclude that, under § 70504(a), the question whether a vessel is ‘subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States’ is a matter of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.”56
 
The court went on to reason that “Congress not only 
specified that the ‘jurisdiction of the United States with respect to a vessel’ 
is a threshold question determined by the court, but also that it is ‘not an 
element of the offense,’ . . .  fortifying its jurisdictional character.”57 
2. Subject to the Jurisdiction of the United States Does Not Implicate 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The First Circuit has taken the stance that “subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States” “refers to the substantive reach of the statute—
applying to some vessels but not others—and not to the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the court.”58
 
Subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
applies to the power of the statute and not a preliminary question for the 
courts to determine, such as the amount-in-controversy. The First Circuit 
case determined if “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” 
                                            
 51.  Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622, 624. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 626. 
 54.  Daniel, supra note 4 at 37. 
 55.  U.S. v. Miranda, 780 F.3d 1185 (2015). 
 56.  Id. at 1192. 
 57.  Id. at 1193. 
 58.  Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440, 443. 
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implicates subject matter jurisdiction. The facts are as follows: two 
individuals were rescued on the high seas of the coast of the British Virgin 
Islands; the United States Coast Guard responded and found bales of 
cocaine; the defendants “were indicted for possessing the cocaine, with 
intent to distribute it, aboard ‘a vessel without nationality’”.59
 
The First 
Circuit went on to articulate the reasoning of their decision. The court 
stated that the legislative history did not suggest that Congress had in mind 
the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.60
 
The court also went on to 
articulate why “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” does not 
implicate subject matter jurisdiction. The court focused on the wording of 
the statute stating, “nothing in the wording of the statute suggests such an 
intention. The term ‘jurisdiction’ is notoriously malleable and is used in a 
variety of contexts that have nothing whatever to do with the court's 
subject matter jurisdiction”61
 
The court also cites Black’s Law Dictionary 
in determining the meaning of jurisdiction.62
 
Black’s Law Dictionary 
states that jurisdiction is “a government’s general power to exercise 
authority over all persons and things within its territory.”63 
The Second Circuit, in deciding Prado, cited and followed the 
Gonzalez decision that the First Circuit had made.64
 
The Prado court said 
that the First Circuit illustrated a persuasive opinion that “demonstrates 
that the MDLEA’s reference poses the question whether its prohibition on 
drug possession extends to the vessel in question — not whether a 
prosecution under the statute falls within the subject matter jurisdiction of 
the federal courts.”65
 
The Prado court describes multiple reasons why 
“subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” does not implicate subject 
matter jurisdiction.66 
C. Canons of Construction 
 The first step to determine which set of cases is decided properly is to 
look to the canons of construction and distill the meaning of the statute. 
Some of the typical rules of statutory interpretation include looking at the 
plain or natural meaning of the words, looking at the law as a whole, 
                                            
 59.  Id. at 441. 
 60.  Id. at 443. 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Jurisdiction Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
 64.  Prado, 933 F.3d 121 at 132. 
 65.  Id.  
 66.  Id. at 133-134. 
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looking to the purpose of the law, as well as examining the legislative 
history and intent. 
When looking at the meaning of statutes, courts look at the plain 
meaning of the words. The definition of jurisdiction and subject matter 
jurisdiction are different. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, subject 
matter jurisdiction is defined as “jurisdiction over the nature of the case 
and the type of relief sought; the extent to which a court can rule on the 
conduct of persons or the status of things.”67 In other words, subject matter 
jurisdiction determines in what court a family matter or bankruptcy case 
can be heard. Jurisdiction casts a much wider net and is defined as “a 
government.”68 
Turning to the context of MDLEA, “[t]he normal rule of statutory 
construction assumes that ‘identical words used in different parts of the 
same act are intended to have the same meaning.’”69
 
In § 70506(c) and § 
70503(a) of MDLEA, the same phrase (“a vessel subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States”) is used in the same context (prohibiting drug 
possession on board the vessel),70 and § 70506(c) “applies in 
circumstances in which the federal courts will play no role whatsoever.”71  
Giving one section a different meaning than another section within the 
same act goes against the standard practice of statutory interpretation: 
giving identical words the same meaning. Additionally, in regard to 
subject matter jurisdiction, “the Supreme Court's guidance for interpreting 
ambiguous statutory requirements instructs that such a requirement does 
not go to subject matter jurisdiction absent a ‘clear statement’ to that 
effect.”72 
Subject matter jurisdiction in every federal criminal prosecution 
comes from 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and furthermore, in criminal cases, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 3231 is almost always the entire jurisdictional inquiry.73
 
Specifically, 
since subject matter jurisdiction is already outlined in a statute, in regard 
to federal criminal prosecution, it would be redundant for MDLEA to state 
that courts would have subject matter jurisdiction. Regarding this method 
of interpretation, the Prado court stated that, “to conclude that the district 
court nonetheless lacked jurisdiction of this prosecution of an offense 
under the laws of the United States, we would need to conclude that the 
                                            
 67.  Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
 68.  Jurisdiction, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
 69.  Sorenson v. Sec’y of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986) (quoting Helvering v. 
Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 (1934). 
 70.  Prado, 933 F.3d 121 at 143-144. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 135. 
 73.  McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1252 n.11 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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MDLEA somehow displaced, superseded, or limited § 3231’s express 
grant of jurisdiction.”74 
Overall, it is apparent, using the canons of construction, that “subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States” does not implicate subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Prado court came to the correct conclusion that “subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States” does not implicate subject matter 
jurisdiction. Multiple courts have decided the issue of whether the 




The Prado court laid out 
persuasive reasoning why “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” 
does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. The Prado court laid out 
seven different reasons why “subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States” cannot mean or implicate subject matter jurisdiction.76
 
The seven 
reasons include: there is already currently a provision conferring subject 
matter; the Supreme Court recognizes different meanings for the word 
jurisdiction; the natural meaning of the words do not implicate subject 
matter jurisdiction; if interpreted to include subject matter jurisdiction, it 
would give the clause a highly expansive meaning; federal statutes 
conferring subject matter jurisdiction use many different formulations; the 
term “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” is used in MDLEA 
to refer to the reach of United States laws; the decisions of other courts 
have not recognized that it could have another meaning or have not 
recognized that the same phrase is used incompatibly throughout title 46.77
  
Many of the reasons laid out in the court’s decision tie directly to 
interpretation of statutes and how the canons of construction are used. One 
of the most compelling of those seven reasons is that there is already a 
general provision in United States law that defines subject matter 
jurisdiction.78
 
18 U.S.C.S. § 3231 states that the district courts of the 
United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the 
States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.79
 
Furthermore, 
“the terms ‘subject to the jurisdiction of the United States’ and ‘vessel 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States’ appear repeatedly in the 
                                            
 74.  Prado, 933 F.3d 121 at 135. 
 75.  See Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088; Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622; Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440. 
 76.  Prado, 933 F.3d 211 at 134-145 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  18 U.S.C.S. § 3231. 
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MDLEA . . . in contexts where those phrases refer unmistakably to the 
reach of United States laws (as exercises of legislative jurisdiction) and 
not to the jurisdiction of the courts.”80
 
“That reach was limited by 
Congress to minimize conflict with foreign nations who might also assert 
rights to regulate.”81
 
Turning to one of the foundations of statutory 
interpretation, “[t]he natural meaning of the words of the statute . . . make 
clear that the term ‘vessel subject to the United States’ specifies the reach, 
or coverage, of the statute and does not in any way address the jurisdiction 
of the court.”82
 
Jurisdiction in this case is the fact that the statute applies 
to some vessels but not to others. 
Turning to another canon of construction, the court goes on to analyze 
the legislative intent behind MDLEA. “The MDLEA was one of a series 
of steps Congress took in the 1980s and 1990s to extend the reach of the 
federal drug laws beyond the territory of the United States.”83
 
In order to 
achieve this goal, Congress “specif[ied] the circumstances in which a 
nation’s laws apply extraterritorially typifies a legislature's exercise of 
legislative jurisdiction by defining the statute’s reach.”84
 
Legislative 
jurisdiction is known as jurisdiction to prescribe.85
 
MDLEA creates laws 
that go beyond the borders of the United States, specifically into 
international waters. When creating laws of this nature there are often 
three legislative concerns: “(1) whether it is consistent with international 
law to so extend the reach of the nation’s laws; (2) whether doing so 
respects comity among nations, or would cause undesired friction with 
foreign nations; and, (3) finally, exactly how the extraterritorial reach of 
the statute is defined.”86
 
 
When creating a statute that expands the reach of the United States 
beyond its borders, the United States does not want to create laws that 
interfere with the rights of other countries or infringe on international law. 
The language “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” addresses 
the above three concerns of the legislature, by limiting the reach of the 
statute which in turn limits interference with international sovereignty and 
the sovereignty of other countries.87
 
In support of the Second Circuit’s 
holding, the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” is a 
limitation on the statute that “one of the fundamental[s]. . . of maritime 
                                            
 80.  Prado, 933 F.3d 121 at 133-134. 
 81.  United States v. Matos-Luchi, 627 F.3d 1, n.4 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 82.  Prado, 933 F.3d 121 at 134. 
 83.  Matos-Luchi, 627 F.3d at 10 (Lipez, J., dissenting). 
 84.  Prado, 933 F.3d 121 at 136 (emphasis omitted). 
 85.  Id. at 132-133. 
 86.  Id. at 136-137 
 87.  Id. at 136. 
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law is the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction, which means that a 
vessel on the high seas is not subject to boarding, search, seizure, or arrest 
by any nation other than its flag state.”88
 
If “subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States” is interpreted as a reach of the statute, the statute would 
then be a limit on the power of the United States and would not conflict 
with the fundamental principles of maritime law. Furthermore, it is an 
accepted international principle that “all states may also board and inspect 
vessels . . . that are ‘stateless,’ meaning they are not legitimately registered 
to any state.”89
 
Reading “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” 
with consideration of international principles it is clear that “subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States” is a statutory limit. 
MDLEA defines vessels as “subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States” in similar terms as international principles. If the language “subject 
to the jurisdiction” implicated subject matter jurisdiction and was not 
considered a statutory limitation it would appear that MDLEA would not 
have a real limit on the statutory reach. Without a limit on the reach of 
MDLEA it is possible that the language of MDLEA could cause some 
conflict in the international community. 
Additionally, subject matter jurisdiction is a preliminary question for 
the court to determine and “unlike venue and the other procedural . . . 
matters . . . a failure to prove that defendants’ conduct occurred on board 
a covered vessel amounts to a failure to prove that the defendants violated 
the MDLEA.”90
 
The fact that a failure to prove that a defendant engaged 
in a prohibited act on a vessel subject to the United States suggests that the 
phrase “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” is solely a statutory 
limitation and not affiliated with subject matter jurisdiction. To be 
prosecuted under MDLEA the vessel that is part of the crime has to be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. For example, if a vessel 
was flying a Canadian flag and was registered with Canada, the vessel 
would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Conversely, 
if there was a ship in international waters, like many of the ships in the 
above cases, and the vessel was not flying a flag and was not registered in 
a country, then the ship would be subject to the United States. In the above 
two scenarios determining if a ship is or is not subject to the United States 
is all about what type of vessel the ship is, if it is flying a flag, or if it is 
                                            
 88.  Aaron J. Casavant, In Defense of the U.S. Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act: A 
Justification for the Law's Extraterritorial Reach, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. L. J. 191, 203 
(2017). 
 89.  James Kraska, Broken Taillight at Sea: The Peacetime International Law of Visit, 
Board, Search, and Seizure, 16 OCEANS & COASTAL L.J. 1, 26 (2010). 
 90.  Matos-Luchi, 627 F.3d at 14 (Lipez, J., dissenting). 
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registered to a nationality. The above determination, and the determination 
that courts including the Prado court have made, is not a subject matter 
jurisdiction inquiry. 
Overall, the reasoning and connection to statutory interpretation in the 
Prado case is extremely persuasive and holds true to the canons of 
construction. The plain meaning of the words “subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States” read in context of MDLEA indicate that subject 
matter jurisdiction is not implicated. The layout and legislative history also 
make it clear that the only interpretation of “subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States” is a statutory reach and does not implicate subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Circuit split is currently leading to a great deal of confusion. The 
confusion can lead to reversal of criminal defendants’ convictions 
depending on which circuit the defendant is convicted in. For example, if 
a defendant is prosecuted in a Circuit that interprets “subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States” as implicating subject matter jurisdiction 
but not as a statutory reach, the defendant could be convicted. Conversely, 
if a Circuit interprets “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” as a 
statutory limitation, the defendant’s conviction could be overturned if the 
elements of the statute are not met.91
 
In order to clear the confusion that the MDLEA has created, Congress 
could add an amendment to the act that clarifies whether “subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States” does or does not implicate subject matter 
jurisdiction. The addition could be as simple as an additional line in the 
statute. If Congress decides not to make an amendment to MDLEA, a case 
would have to be brought before the Supreme Court in order for a ruling 
to be pronounced. 
Overall, it is evident that some clarification is needed either by the 
Supreme Court or Congress in order to clarify the meaning of MDLEA so 
that defendants throughout the United States have comparable results. 
Congress or the Supreme Court should follow the well-articulated 
reasoning of the Second Circuit and deem that “subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States” does not in fact implicate subject matter jurisdiction. 
To decide otherwise could possibly lead to more confusion because that 
would mean, within the criminal context and under MDLEA, there would 
be multiple definitions of subject matter jurisdiction. 
  
                                            
 91.  See generally, Prado, 933 F.3d 121. 
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